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111 tl1e Sttpt·ente Cortt-t of the 
State of Utah 
ALLEN BECK, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
·RHODES JEPfESEN, d.b.a. 
Jeppesen Potato Chip Company, 
and OZIAS HARVEY HARWARD, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CASE 
7960 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Many of the facts set forth in the Appellants' Brief are 
not disputed by the Respondent. However, Respondent con-
tends that there are ample facts and substantial evidence 
to justify and sustain the decision of the trial court. 
As pointed out by the Appellant, the collision occurred 
on an alley way about 12 feet wide at the rear of certain 
business buildings in. downtown Provo. The Respondent, 
Allen Beck, had just started out from a parl{ed position and 
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2_ 
was travelling in an easterly direction, still in low gear (R. 
7). As the front of his car went past the edge of the build-
ing, he saw the truck about twenty or thirty feet away (R. 
7). Respondent estimated his own speed at about 10 miles 
per hour (R. 17). As quickly as he saw the truck, Respond-
ent applied his brakes (R. 7). The truck, driven by De-
fendant, Ozias Harvey Harward, hit into the Respondent's 
car just back of the right front fender, knocking the Re-
spondent's car sideways into a power pole (R. 7). Defend-
ant, Rhodes Jeppesen, sitting beside the driver of the truck, 
saw the Respondent's car at a time when 'Defendants' truck 
was thirty to forty feet away (R. 52). He "hollered, hold 
'er" to the driver (R. 53). According to Defendant Har-
ward, its driver, defendants' truck was only, travelling 3 to 
4 miles per hour just prior to the collision ( R. 46) . Mr. 
Harward, driver of the truck, came over to Respondent 
immediately after the accident and stated to the Respond-
ent that he was sorry he didn't see him (R. 8). Appellant's 
car was pushed sideways four or five feet into a pole (R. 
21). The right front end of Appellant's car was not dam-
aged (R. 39, 63). 
STATEMENT O·F POINTS 
Point I. The Plaintiff's evidence was substantial and 
was sufficient to .support the finding of the court that the 
Defendants were negligent. 
Poi~t II. The Plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to 
support the court's decision that the negligence of the De-
fendants was the proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. 
Point III. There was no error on the part of the court 
in refusing to hold the Plaintiff guilty of contributory neg-
ligence as a matter of law or from the facts. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINTS I AND II 
THE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO SHOW THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLI-
GENT AND THlAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS THE . 
... 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PUAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
The Plaintiff had just started from a parked position, 
and his car was in low gear (R. 7). As the front of Plain-
tiff's car got to the edge of the building where he could see, 
he saw the truck approximately twenty or thirty feet back 
in the _alley from the intersection and Plaintiff applied ,his 
brakes (R. 7). In order for the Plaintiff's car to have been 
pushed sideways into the pole, the Plaintiff's car was obvi-
ously stopped within a distance of ten feet or less. 
Appellants adhere to and argue the proposition that 
Respondent's car sideswiped them. The Respondent sub-. 
mits that it would be utterly and physically impossible for 
the Respondent's car to have struck Appellants' truck with~ 
out causing so much as a scratch on th~ right front portion 
of Respondent's car. The trial court heard and considered 
such argument both at the trial and at the hearing on mo-
tion for new trial, and rejected that contention. Reswnd-
ent's. car was struck on the side, just back of the right front 
fender, and was knocked sideways into a power pole (R. 
7). The right front portion of Respondent's car was _not_ . 
damaged at all (R. 23, 39, 63). AppelltUits try to explain 
this away by saying that App~llants' oumper was higher 
than Respondent's bumper. Appellants, however, do not 
and could not contend that Appellants' 'bumper was higher 
than Respondent's right front fender, which was not dam- -
aged at the front of the car. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
' 
Defendant -Rhodes Jeppesen testified that Respondent's 
car was thirty to forty feet away when he first saw it (R. 
52). According to Defendant Harward, he could not have 
been driving over ''probably three or four miles per hour" 
(R. 46). At a speed of three to four miles per hour and with 
a distance of thirty to forty feet, Respondent submits that 
an ordinary and prudent driver could readily have brought 
the truck to a stop and thereby avoided striking the Re-
spondent's ·car, which was, and had to be, in the so called 
intersection. Moreover, Defendant Ha.rward, the driver of 
the car, was not keeping any kind of a proper lookout, be-
ca..use he told the Respondent immediately after the accident, 
"He was sorry, he didn't see me" (R. 8). 
-The record on appeal must be read in the light most 
favorable to the party for whom the trier of facts has found. 
Lowder v. Holley, et al (Utah), 233 P(2) 850, 351. Re-
spondent respectfully submits that the record contains sub-
stantial evidence to-support the finding that the Defendan~_ 
were negligent _and that their negligence was the proximate 
cause of the accident. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AND CORRECT-
LY REFUSED TO/ FIN;D THE RESPONDENT GUILTY 
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MA TrER OF 
LAW OR FROM THE FACTS OF TillS CASE. 
On brief the Appellants charge Respondent with con-
tributory negligence for ( 1) Excessive speed; ( 2) Failure 
to yield the right of way, and (3) "For failing to be just 
a little more cautious than normally expected." Respond· 
ent will deal with those charges in the order above set forth. 
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1. Excessive Speed. It is true that there is conflict 
as to the speed at which Respondent was travelling. The 
trial Judge had the respective witnesses before him and 
was in a position where he could see and hear the witnesses 
and evaluate their testimony. He heard the Respondent 
testify that he was still in low gear and that he was tra-
velling about 10 miles per hour (R. 7). The trial Judge 
had a right to believe that testimony. Moreover, Respond-
ent urges that this testimony is far more likely to be cor-
rect and far more plausible and ·convincing than was the 
estimate of Defendants that the Plaintiff was going 40 miles 
per hour. HJad the Plaintiff been speeding at all, he would 
readily have covered the few remaining feet in the inter-
section before Defendants could cover thirty to forty feet 
at three to four miles per hour. The record contains sub-
stantial evidence to support the finding of the trial court. 
2. Failure to Yield the Right of Way. The rule that 
the car to the right has the right of way at an interse'Ction 
comes into play only when the two enter the intersection 
at the same time. When one car preempts the intersection, 
that car is entitled to the right of way. However, in the 
instant case it was not merely a case where Plaintiff en-
tered the intersection first, but was a situation that would 
satisfy the minimum requirements of the Boulevard rule·~ 
It was a blind corner, and neither party could see through 
that wall. Plaintiff testified: "I was just starting out, I 
think I was in low gear, as the front of iny car got past 
the edge of the building where I could see I noticed the 
truck approximately twenty or thirty feet back in there, 
and I slammed on my brakes and then it. hit into me just 
back of the right front fender, knocking me sideways into 
the power pole on the left side of my car on the front" (R. 
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7). The speed of the Defendants' truck, according to the 
testimony of the -Defendants, was three to four miles per 
hour (R 46). :Obviously, at that speed and with that dis-
tance the Defendant driver had a clear opportunity to stop 
his vehicle had he been keeping a proper lookout and had 
he observed what was on the road ahead of him. Defend-
ant, Rhodes Jeppesen, testified that he first saw Plaintiff's 
car when he was thirty to forty feet away (R. 52). As 
pointed, out by Mr. Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion 
in the Lowder v. Holley case, supra, reasonable minds can 
and certainly do differ in a case like this, but one ·cannot 
say there. was any. error in the fact finder's conclusions. 
The crux of the question is' whether the Plaintiff used 
''due care." Martin v. Stevens, (Utah), 243 P(2) 747. On 
the basis of the record here· considered that determination 
was properly one for the trier of the facts, and the record 
contains substantial evidence to support a finding that 
Plaintiff did use "due care." 
3. Failure to Be Just a Little More Cautious Than 
Normally Expected. It must be assumed that the trial 
.court took ·into account all of the facts and circumstances 
made known to him. Certainly, the test he applied in de-
termining whether the Plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
n~gligence was whether or not the Plaintiff used the same 
degree of care and caution that an ordinary and prudent 
person would have used under like or similar circumstances. 
The evidence here shows that a tall building stood adja-
cent to the intersection. One look at the Plaintiff's Exhi-
bits on file herein clearly establishes that one could not see 
through that building. The Plaintiff had just started from 
a parked position and was still in low gear, travelling about 
10 mil~s per hour (R. 7). It was a physical impossibility 
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for him to see what was coming on the east side of that 
building until his car advanced to a point beyond the edge 
of the building where his view was not obstructed. There 
is not one shred of evidence in this record that a speed of 
10 miles per hour was beyond a speed that would have been 
used by an ordinary prudent person. The Plaintiff obvi-
ously stopped his car within a distance of seven or eight 
feet, because his car was pushed sideways into the pole at 
the northeast corner of the intersection. His car was about 
15 feet long (R. 16) and the intersection, (measured oblique-
ly) was only 18 feet (R. 21). When the Plaintiff could first 
see the Defendants their truck was twenty to thirty feet 
back from -the intersection (R. 7) and travelling at from 
three to four miles per hour ( R. 46) . certainly, the De-
fendant Harward, had he been watching the road ahead, 
could have stopped the truck in time to avoid the collision, 
and Respondent feels confident that the trier of the facts 
reasoned that an ordinary and prudent person under sim-
ilar circwnstances would have been able to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
There is substantial evidence to support the findings 
of the lower court that the Defendants were guilty of neg--
ligence and that such negligence was the proximate cause 
of Plaintiff's injuries. The Respondent urges the Supreme 
Court to affirm the decision and to award the Respondent 
his costs incurred for this appeal. 
Respectfully subm-itted, 
ALDRICH & BULLOCK; 
45 North University Ave., 
Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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